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Short Term versus Long Term Impact of Managers: 
Evidence from the Football Industry 
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ABSTRACT 
Studies into the impact of top manager change on organisation performance have revealed 
inconsistent findings. Using longitudinal data over a 12-year period on football organisations, 
we test for the short-term and long-term effects of manager change in comparison to the 
tenures of incumbent top managers. We find that long incumbent tenures are associated with 
performance far above the average. But when looking at change events, contrary to theoretical 
expectations, we find that change in the short term leads to a brief reprieve in poor 
performance only for performance to deteriorate in the long term as underlying weaknesses 
once again take hold. Our findings reveal the illusion of a short-term reprieve and the long-
term consequences of this illusion. We map several implications for research and practice 
from our work. 
 
Keywords: Football; illusion effect; manager change; scapegoating; succession; Premier 
League; tenure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Manager changes are critical decisions that can shape organisational performance 
(Miller, 1991). However, inconsistent findings (Greiner, Cummings & Bhambri, 2002) have 
led to three contrasting theories that explain the association between manager change and 
organisational performance. First, scapegoating theory posits that manager change does not 
affect performance (Sakano & Lewin, 1999). According to this theory, managers are replaced 
as a ritual to signal that boards of directors have taken action to address poor performance. 
Yet, Khanna & Poulsen (1995) find that managers are rarely to blame for poor performance as 
they do not deliberately make value-destroying decisions. Scapegoating then occurs as a CEO 
or other executives protect their own positions by blaming and removing certain managers. 
Changing managers, therefore, may not resolve underlying organisational weaknesses 
(Sakano & Lewin, 1999). 
Second, vicious circle theory postulates that manager change harms performance 
because replacement events disrupt well-established processes and bring instabilities and 
tensions that deteriorate performance (Grusky, 1963). The disruptive nature of manager 
change is exacerbated by the loss of firm-specific knowledge which further deteriorates 
performance in the short-to-medium term (Greiner et al., 2002). The contrast between these 
two theories raises two research questions: (1) Does short-term performance improve after 
manager change? (2) If no improvement occurs, is there evidence of a vicious circle of 
perpetual change and underperformance? 
Third, tenure and life-cycle theories (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991) suggest that a new 
manager develops new processes, a new team and a fresh strategy that will improve long-term 
performance as they learn and make necessary adaptations. Yet Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) 
suggest that managers over time become dysfunctional in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with performance. Studies propose that organisational performance increases for the first 8-10 
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years of tenure but decreases thereafter as managers apply old formulas to new conditions 
(Miller & Shamsie, 2001). However, Henderson, Miller & Hambrick (2006) suggest this 
pattern might depend on industry. This contrast raises two further research questions: (1) 
Does tenure deteriorate performance over time? (2) In the long term, does performance 
increase dramatically to justify manager change? 
These three contrasting theories suggest that short-term and long-term differences 
might explain inconsistent findings, yet studies rarely discriminate between the two. We 
address this problem. Our assumption is that while scapegoating and vicious circle theories 
explain the short-term impact of manager change, tenure and life-cycle theories explain the 
long-term impact. We analyse football organisations registered in England’s Premier League 
between 1992 and 2004 to this end. Research on manager change in sports organisations 
inspired succession research in the general management literature (Giambatista, Rowe & 
Riaz, 2005), and the choice of industry confers several advantages. Specifically, objectives in 
football organisations are clearer than those of a conventional firm (Koning, 2003); measuring 
and assessing the success (or otherwise) of manager change is less ambiguous (Brady, 
Bolchover & Sturgess, 2008); and competing organisations possess similar structures, 
objectives and industry constraints (Audas, Dobson & Goddard, 2002). 
Our contributions to theory are two-fold and relate directly to the discovery of an 
illusion of short-term recovery, which is not accounted for in existing theories. First, our 
results challenge the theory that short-term disruption weakens performance further before 
learning and adaptations by new managers eventually restore performance. Our results 
suggest that as new managers implement a wave of changes to signal their arrival, a modest 
positive disruption results, which creates an illusion that the fundamental problems of the 
organisation have been resolved. But the lull is illusionary because performance in the long-
term afterwards deteriorates at the same rate prior to dismissal. Consequently, a vicious circle 
 6 
emerges not because of disruption but because of the illusion of a return to better performance 
and the delayed effect of hasty adaptations. Vicious circle theory fails to account for these 
negative consequences. 
Second, our results challenge Hambrick & Fukutomi’s (1991) theory that new 
managers will positively impact performance immediately upon taking office and continue to 
do so until dysfunction sets in. The short-term reprieve can fool new managers into believing 
that problems are solved, leading them to misinterpret organisational conditions. 
Consequently, long-term weaknesses again take hold and these again compromise 
performance. The learning process must then restart as managers realise the depth of 
problems are far greater. Tenure theories then require revision to better account for the 
learning experienced by new managers. Our results do not vindicate scapegoating theory 
either because performance improvement is possible from manager change but the firm 
suffers from the loss of firm-specific knowledge when existing managers are replaced. 
These results explain why arguments of scapegoating emerge, why vicious circles 
appear, and why the efficacy of change may not follow the assumptions of tenure and life-
cycle theories. Thus, researchers benefit from empirical evidence reconciling the short-term 
and long-term impact of manager change with contrasting theories of the effects of change. 
Practitioners benefit from research evidence of the consequences of change, the illusion of a 
short-term reprieve and the long-term consequences of this illusion.  
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Top managers exhibit specialist skills depending on their role. Football managers for 
example may be likened to senior operating officers1. An operating officer is typically a 
CEO’s greatest asset; while CEOs focus on external and strategic activities, an operating 
officer focuses on internal operating matters, solves workplace problems, detects early signs 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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of marketplace change, and nurtures talent (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004); much in the same 
way as a football manager. Football managers are more outward-facing however with much 
emphasis given to their external and strategic involvement. The football manager in summary 
is responsible for strategy (playing style and player organisation), tactics (measures taken for 
or during individual games), talent nurturing, human capital acquisition, media management, 
competitor analysis and managing marketplace change. 
Research into manager change in sports and general business organisations inform our 
work2. Our theoretical development is framed by scapegoating, vicious circle, and tenure and 
life-cycle theories of manager change. In scapegoating theory, the loss of firm-specific 
knowledge acts as a mechanism to explain why performance might not improve after manager 
change. Vicious circle theory regards disruption as well as loss of firm-specific knowledge as 
mechanisms to explain further deterioration in performance after manager change. Tenure and 
life-cycle theories view learning and adaptations made by managers over time as 
mechanisms to explain the inverted U-shaped performance exhibited by new and current 
managers. These mechanisms form the basis of our discussion. 
For reference, we define ‘short-term’ as 10 games after the change event (e.g., Audas 
et al., 2002). We define the ‘long-term’ as 30 games afterwards. This classification is 
appropriate because the average tenure of football managers is now approximately 1.38 years 
(Bridgewater, 2007) (which assuming 1 game each week would amount to about 70 games); 
the existence of the league calendar; and the fact that in a full season, a team will only play 38 
league games. We use points earned to define performance because it determines league 
position, on which managers are principally judged (Audas et al., 2002; Brady et al., 2008). 
Manager Change in Sporting Organisations 
                                                 
2 Although we cannot exhaustively review the literature herein, Giambatista et al. (2005) and Kesner & Sebora 
(1994) offer comprehensive literature reviews of manager change. 
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Football is increasingly seen as a domain from which managers can learn new 
techniques for organisation, people and change management. Brady et al. (2008) cite the case 
of Guus Hiddink and South Korea as perfect illustration of this point. Hiddink was the Dutch-
born coach of South Korea from early 2001 to late 2002. Following tremendous success at the 
2002 World Cup, the Korean Government specified the need for Korean society to apply “the 
Hiddink-style leadership to the operation of government [and] corporations” (Brady et al., 
2008, p.54). Korea Telecom also highlighted Hiddink’s ability to coax an effective blend of 
flair and work-rate from his team as a “crucial lesson” (Brady et al., 2008, p.54). Hiddink 
organised his team to deliver success with much less apparent ability than many of their 
defeated opponents. His style was characterised in Korea as clear vision, steady 
implementation, discipline and introduction of openness, global standards and fair 
competition (Brady et al., 2008). Despite a poor start to his tenure, characterised by media 
criticism and poor results, the turnaround in long-term performance displayed at the World 
Cup cemented his place in South Korean history. 
Table 1 summarises studies that examine manager change in a sports context. These 
studies suggest a pattern of short-term decline followed by long-term recovery (Giambatista, 
2004; cf. McTeer et al., 1995), much like Hiddink’s Korean tenure. These studies posit 
disruption as a reason for short-term fluctuation and time needed to learn and implement 
appropriate individual and firm-level change as basis for long-term performance. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 Research on football organisations supports these assertions. Audas et al. (2002) 
found that manager change causes further underperformance over the following 3 months. 
Thus, a minimum of 3 months is needed to train, improve and align human capital with the 
strategies of the new manager. Bruinshoofd & ter Weel (2003) and Koning (2003) found that 
performance either worsened under new managers or would have recovered faster without 
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change. Although both studies overlook short-term and long-term consequences, they do 
suggest that disruption and loss of firm-specific knowledge render manager change an 
ineffective strategy; symptomatic of scapegoating and vicious cycle theories. 
Disruption and organisational instability might shape the short-term effect of change, 
but its long-term effect is shaped by how new managers learn and adapt the organisation to 
match new strategies going forward. Unless a manager (incumbent or otherwise) receives 
more time at the helm to address the underlying causes of poor performance, disruption and 
increased organisational instability can trigger a vicious circle of decline (Grusky, 1963). 
Managers and Organisational Performance over Time 
 Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) theorise seasons in the tenure of managers where 
managers make immediate major organisational changes (reflecting their own paradigms3) 
followed by more gradual, incremental initiatives that revise the fit between the organisation 
and its environment. However, Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) posit that the initial years of 
performance improvement give way to decline as the manager becomes increasingly 
psychologically disengaged. Miller (1991) and Miller & Shamsie (2001) place the decline 
event at around 8-10 years of tenure. Decline occurs because managers’ successes over time 
lead them to reinforce their preconceptions, maintain ‘tried and true’ strategies, and shape 
organisation initiatives around their own biases (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). Decline then 
triggers manager change. However, these views assume that immediate radical change is 
feasible and desirable, that short-term performance will improve accordingly, and that in the 
long term, a failure to adapt is inevitable.  
Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) acknowledge that exceptions to their model may exist. 
Exceptions can be caused by industry, competitive and organisational pressures for top 
                                                 
3 We use the term “paradigm” in line with existing studies (e.g., Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hendersen et al., 
2006). These studies posit that managers have fairly rigid views. While these can change, they do not change 
readily because managers’ understanding of how to conduct organisations is shaped considerably through 
education and experience over time. Although Popperian theory specifies that paradigms are not rigid but change 
through falsification, for consistency, we use the term in line with prior studies. 
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managers to remain vigilant. Greater manager vigilance and adaptation is expected to persist 
in environments that have moderate pressures in the form of competitive rivalry and where 
owners, overseers or stakeholders place considerable emphasis on a top manager to perform 
(Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). These conditions approximate those of the football industry 
(Koning, 2003). Owner, fan and media pressure to perform can drive top managers to remain 
vigilant and adaptive to sustain long-term performance as their tenure increases. Ironically, 
these same pressures induce dismissal, which sports studies have associated with 
scapegoating due to little evidence of improvement (Audas et al., 2002; Bruinshoofd & ter 
Weel, 2003; Koning, 2003). 
 Some turbulence in organisational performance is inevitable over time. But Simsek 
(2007) argues that long tenures generate a well-seasoned individual that possesses 
idiosyncratic knowledge of the organisation and its industry following years of learning and 
experience. These incumbent managers are then best placed to restore performance. Their 
personal knowledge of organisational resources, human capital and strategy enables better 
identification and correction of weaknesses, improving performance in time (Simsek, 2007). 
In football organisations, Bruinshoofd & ter Weel (2003) found that performance would have 
improved more rapidly had organisations retained rather than replaced their managers. Brady 
et al. (2008) discovered that teams with better talent quotients are regularly outperformed by 
teams with similar or worse talent quotients. Accordingly, managers’ idiosyncratic knowledge 
of team talent and players’ contextual talent can enable superior long-term performance. 
Coaxing talent further depends on shaping and refining strategy, culture and training 
schemes. Kor (2003) argues that longer tenures increase managers’ knowledge of firm 
resources and improves opportunity identification. In a football context, increased tenure 
augments managers’ knowledge of players’ strengths and weaknesses, which enables 
managers to better match players to task demands. Indeed, giving managers more time has 
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been associated with better long-term performance as time is needed for managers to nurture, 
train and shape human capital (Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). In the long term 
therefore, changes are more likely to enhance performance when building on existing 
formulas, structures and resources than entirely new ones (Sastry, 1997). Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: Longer manager tenure is positively related to performance. 
Short Term Performance after Manager Change  
Manager change is meant to stimulate adaptive behaviour from incoming managers. 
New managers are expected to reinvent strategy and redeploy resources to reinvigorate the 
organisation and restore its excellence at core activities (Virany et al., 1992). However, 
proponents of scapegoating theory report that little meaningful change occurs after succession 
(Sakano & Lewin, 1999). Scapegoating theory suggests that in underachieving organisations, 
blame for poor performance is placed on a top manager for being responsible for strategy or 
its execution (Khanna & Poulsen, 1995). However Khanna & Poulsen (1995) found that such 
managers are scapegoats for greater endemic problems, finding no evidence that past 
managerial decisions are the root causes of organisational failings. Consequently, change 
gives rise to disruption which masks underlying problems thereby causing further damage to 
performance in the short term (Brown, 1982), as is indicative of vicious cycle theory. 
In sports organisations, Audas et al. (2002) reported that in a 3-month period after 
change, performance continued to struggle. Audas et al. (2002) speculated that a minimum of 
3 months is then needed to train, renew and improve human capital to align strategy with the 
views of the new manager. Time is also needed to establish a suitable system to coax 
exceptional performance from what may be a group of ‘ordinary’ people (Brady et al., 2008). 
But, prior research in the management literature suggests that new managers typically need 6-
18 months to initiate major change (Gabarro, 1987), because their ability to execute these 
strategic changes in the short term is limited by organisation, industry and learning constraints 
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(Henderson et al., 2006). Whilst manager change is still performed in the hope of a ‘shock 
effect’ that promotes internal change (Bruinshoofd & ter Weel, 2003), a new manager lacks 
firm-specific knowledge of prevailing organisational conditions, making it harder for them to 
instigate appropriate change (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). 
Gabarro (1987) found that initial organisational change carried out by a new manager 
is rarely strategic but rather is based simply on paradigm realignment in an effort to rapidly 
move away from past regimes. Initial changes and adaptations are therefore informed by the 
biases of the individual (Hope Hailey & Balogun, 2002). Gabarro (1987) noted that after this 
initial realignment, an in-depth period of diagnosis and transformation takes place. The lack 
of a strategic approach at the start of the change programme will likely disrupt performance in 
the short term as initial changes are unlikely to resolve underlying problems. 
Disruption to routines and structures can create instability in the short term. Thus, new 
managers may be unable to readily alter strategy, resource allocation and behaviour, further 
deteriorating performance. Grusky (1963) and Gamson & Scotch (1964) put forward a vicious 
circle theory in which poor performance triggers manager change, but its disruptive effect 
further damages performance which leads to further manager change and ultimately a spiral of 
decline. This trend appears evident in the rapidly declining average tenures of football 
managers, now less than 1.38 years (Bridgewater, 2007), with some recent manager tenures 
shorter than 8 months. Since time is needed for new top managers to learn about cause–effect 
relationships relevant to their organisations, the fact they enter with little firm-specific 
knowledge exacerbates this information asymmetry, and delays any impact on performance. 
An illustration of this effect can be seen with the appointment of Jurgen Klinsmann as 
manager of the German national team. Klinsmann immediately introduced new diet, fitness 
and coaching techniques (Brady et al., 2008). Yet short-term performance worsened with the 
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team winning only two matches in seven. Overseers, fans and media were ritually calling for 
his dismissal at this point, symptomatic of vicious circle theory. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Manager change is negatively related to short-term (10-game) 
performance. 
Long Term Performance after Manager Change 
Appropriate changes to strategy and organisational design over time can reverse 
failure, but manager change may take longer than 1 year to effect strategic change and 
increase performance (Giambatista et al., 2005). Miller & Shamsie (2001) argue that 
paradigm realignment between the new manager and the organisation can in fact take 2-4 
years. This can result in a performance lag of 3-5 years depending on industry (Henderson et 
al., 2006). At best this timeframe nears the end of the average tenure of football managers. At 
worst it is far beyond their typical tenure. 
Incumbent managers will already have prior knowledge of resources, employees, 
organisational weaknesses and conditions supporting or obstructing change. Manager change 
removes that intellectual capital necessitating additional learning processes to take place (Kor, 
2003). But new managers tend to be better attuned to the external environment than 
incumbent managers such that manager change can increase the likelihood of transformative 
change to correct performance problems (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Transformational 
change needs time to establish new patterns of activity, standards and strategies across the 
organisation (Hope Hailey & Balogun, 2002). This effort improves when the new manager 
receives ample time to learn, decipher and correct organisational weaknesses. Time also 
enables the top manager to orchestrate, nurture and gain support for new initiatives (Simsek, 
2007). When new managers receive sufficient time to effect strategic change, we can surmise 
that long-term performance should be positive after the initial short-term disruption subsides 
(Giambatista, 2004). 
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This long-term dynamic is further illustrated by the fortunes of Jurgen Klinsmann. 
Klinsmann managed to transform the German playing style and had the courage to continue 
his strategy despite considerable criticism. Following great success at the 2006 World Cup, 
the German business community lauded Klinsmann as a “true modernizer”, an “ideal leader 
of change” and a symbol of “flexible, innovative corporate leadership” (Brady et al., 2008, 
p.55). With time, he successfully isolated Germany’s problems, implemented appropriate 
change and successfully learnt how to coax contextual talent from his players to restore 
performance. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Manager change is positively related to long-term (30-game) 
performance. 
DATA, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
Industry 
We examine football organisations in England’s ‘Premier League’. In 2007, Premier 
League football organisations generated in excess of £1.4 billion in revenue with total wages 
approaching £1 billion; they contributed about £480 million in taxes to the British 
Government; and the growth rate of Premier League revenue is around 4% per annum 
(Deloitte, 2007). Failure can cost organisations tens of millions in lost revenue. For example, 
failure to qualify for the UEFA Champions League can cost £10 million in lost revenue from 
UEFA without accounting for separate sponsorship and advertising revenues (Deloitte, 2007). 
Absolute failure in the Premier League (relegation to a lower league), creates a revenue gap of 
approximately £56 million to £70 million (Deloitte, 2007). Against this backdrop, football 
managers now have a tenure of less than 2 years, falling from 3.12 years at the start of the 
Premier League in 1992 to an average of 1.89 years in 2006-07 with statistics placing the 
average tenure for 2007-08 at 1.38 years (Bridgewater, 2007). The average salary for a 
Premier League football manager remains high and reflects the turbulence of the profession. 
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In 2007, the average salary of the top 5 managers in England was around £3.26 million with 
salaries increasing rapidly in general (Taylor, 2007). 
The choice of industry is advantageous. First, it minimises the random effect of 
industry forces as they are homogeneous to each organisation; organisations possess relatively 
straightforward structures; organisations cannot acquire each other and nor can their 
shareholders or top managers have major holdings in other organisations; and each 
organisation is constrained in its ability to acquire new resources at short notice. Since these 
factors remain constant across organisations, the internal validity of findings increases 
(Giambatista et al., 2005; Pitcher, Chreim & Kisfalvi, 2000). Second, generally, the Chairman 
as the key decision-maker holds the power to recruit and dismiss the single football manager 
(the top manager). The Chairman acts as the chief owner and exercises budgetary power 
whilst the football manager is responsible for running the team, training and nurturing 
employees, human capital acquisitions, team strategy and performance. 
Sample and Dataset 
We obtained longitudinal data from a secondary, commercial source, AFS Enterprises 
Ltd, on football organisations that competed in the English Premier League from its inception 
in 1992 through to 2004. The data contains the results of each competitive game played by 
every team (including points gained, goals scored, goals conceded and league position), the 
manager in charge, length of tenure and changes in manager. Twenty organisations compete 
in the Premier League every season. The data contains the results of more than 5000 football 
matches. No data were collected for games in any other competition as these results are 
independent of results in the Premier League and would raise problems in carrying out 
analysis among teams4. 
Measures 
                                                 
4 Football organisations can take part in domestic and international cup competitions but these results are not 
included because not all teams gain access. Thus, the data would not apply evenly to the teams in our dataset. 
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We call manager change an event, and we divide our event window into three periods. 
10 matches after the change reflect the short-term and 30 matches afterwards capture the 
long-term. We also capture 10 matches before the change as this data can be used for 
comparison to examine for scapegoating. We denote this event window as 10-10-30, which is 
justified given the current average tenure of managers and that the annual league calendar 
consists of 38 games. We use points earned as the performance variable because it is 
transparent (Audas et al., 2002; Brady et al., 2008), has considerable heritage in sports-based 
manager change research (Giambatista et al., 2005) and determines league position5. Teams 
are ranked on the basis of the total points they accumulate by the end of the season, which 
unlocks various revenue rewards such as prize money, competition qualification and greater 
merchandising, sponsorship and advertising opportunities. 
We measure the performance of a given team by two proxies. The first is a proxy for 
current performance, calculated as the points earned during the current match. We denote 
current performance at time (match) t by tp , which is the number of points earned at time t. 
The second proxy measures cumulative performance. We measure cumulative performance 
by a simple cumulative point variable, ∑ ===
ts
s st
pc
1
* . Because 0≥tp , the cumulative 
performance, *tc , trends upwards. However, as tp  is highly unpredictable, this upward 
trending is likely to behave like a random walk with drift:  
ttt cc εδ ++= −
*
1
*       (1) 
where tε  is the disturbance term. However, given an initial value of 
*
0c , a random walk 
process can be written in terms of a deterministic trend process: 
                                                 
5 A points-based model has limitations: league positions are often separated only by one or two points and in the 
event of equal points, league position is separated by goal difference. The main problem is one of expectations. 
Teams can possess different expectations that may increase or decrease the likelihood of dismissal. Cup wins 
might mitigate dismissal as might current league position, but this is complex because expectations can change 
during the season owing to performance. Thus, it is difficult to model even static expectations. Still, our interest 
lies with the effect of manager change, not necessarily the reasons for it. 
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∑
=
++=
t
s
st tcc
1
*
0
* εδ     (2) 
To enable cross-team comparison, we need to specify a benchmark team against which 
all other teams are compared. We assume a benchmark team earns 4 points every three 
matches (i.e., successively wins, draws and loses matches). Thus, this team scores 4/3 points 
every match on average. The cumulative performance of this benchmark team at any period t, 
b
tc , will then trend at around t33.1 . Thus, its data generating process is exactly linear in time. 
 The cumulative abnormal or excess performance of any given team can be calculated 
as the difference between the cumulative score of that team and the cumulative score of the 
benchmark. Thus, the cumulative excess performance at time t, denoted tc , is given by: 
b
ttt ccc −=
*  
Replacing by their respective values, we obtain: 
0t tc t vα β= + +       (3) 
where 33.10 −= δβ , ∑
=
=
t
s
stv
1
ε , and *0c=α . The time series of cumulative performance ( tc ) 
will therefore exhibit no trend if the team in question is not outperforming the benchmark. But 
it will have a positive (negative) trend when the team in question is outperforming 
(underperforming) the benchmark. We call this cumulative measure excess performance.  
Testing the Effect of Change on Cumulative Performance 
To test for the cumulative effect of manager change we use tc  as the dependent 
variable. In order to test for the effect of manager change, we extend model (3) to capture any 
possible changes in the evolution of performance during the period surrounding the event. We 
propose the following model: 
ttttt vtLABc +++++= ][ 3210 ββββα    (4) 
where tv  is a disturbance term and t is the time trend.  
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We use dummy variables to estimate the effect of manager change. The dummy tB  
equals 1 for the 10 matches before the change and zero otherwise. This dummy captures the 
possible poor performance preceding the change and can be used for comparison to examine 
for scapegoating. The second dummy, tA , equals 1 for the 10 matches following the change 
and zero otherwise. This dummy captures the short-term changes in cumulative performance. 
The third dummy, tL , captures the long-term performance effect. It is equal to 1 between the 
11th and 40th matches following the change. 
The betas here are parameters to be estimated and help quantify the effect of manager 
changes. Testing that cumulative performance is affected in the short and long term amounts 
to testing for the significance of 2β  and 3β  respectively. The overall cumulative performance 
(outside the event) is represented by 0β . Finally, 1β  measures the possible fall in 
performance before manager change. 
Testing the Effect of Change on Current Performance 
The dependent variable for current performance, tp , is the number of points earned at 
match-time t. The dependent variable takes three possible states, namely a win, a draw and a 
loss. The team earns 3, 1 and 0 points for winning, drawing and losing a match respectively. 
We assign these values to our dependent variable, tp , namely winning ( 3=tp ), drawing 
( 1=tp ) and losing ( 0=tp ). We model this variable through a probit model following prior 
studies (Audas et al., 2002; Dios Tena & Forrest, 2007). 
The Probit Model 
As the dependent variable has three states, we use an ordered probit to model current 
performance of teams. In a probit model we focus primarily on the probability that the 
dependent variable, m, takes one of the three values. The probabilities are given by: 
Prob(y = 0) = 1-Φ(Index) 
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Prob(y = 1) = Φ(µ-Index)-Φ(-Index) 
Prob(y = 3) = 1-Φ(µ-Index)  
where Φ is the Normal cumulative distribution function, and µ is a threshold parameter. A 
significant estimate of a threshold parameter indicates significant difference between two 
adjacent states. Probit models are estimated by maximum-likelihood method. 
The dependent variable is essentially ‘explained’ within the Index equation, given by:  
itititititititit MApppLABIndex 73625143210 ββββββββ +++++++= −−−   (5) 
where the betas are coefficients to be estimated. The dummy variables, B, A and L are defined 
as before except they are now indexed for team i at time t. The other independent variables 
are 1−itp , 2−itp  and 3−itp , which represent the points earned in the previous three matches 
respectively. These three variables represent the possible momentum effect of the very recent 
performance of a given team. The variable itMA  is the moving average of the past ten 
matches for team i at time t. This variable represents the current average performance of a 
given team. For both current and cumulative performance, under the statistical null hypothesis 
of no effect, 1β , 2β  and 3β  will not be significantly different from zero.  
We use a pooled probit model for two reasons. First, given that we have 28 teams, 
estimating and analysing 28 separate probit results would be difficult to decipher. Second, 
since we are interested in the effect of manager change regardless of when the team played in 
the Premiership and regardless of whether the team made a change during the sample period, 
by pooling data we can capture information that would otherwise have been discarded had we 
estimated individual models. The disadvantage is that we will only examine the overall effect 
because pooling the data discards the individual effect in the panel estimation. However, we 
know of no methodology that actually allows individual effect in a probit framework. Still, 
since we are not directly interested in the teams and only interested in the effect of manager 
change, this should not be too disadvantageous.  
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RESULTS 
Features of Premier League Organisations 
We begin by examining features of the teams that played in the Premiership during the 
sample period. Table 2 shows the number of manager changes, the change ratio (changes per 
100 matches), the mean of MA (10-match moving average of points earned), the standard 
deviation of MA, the cumulative excess points earned by the end of the sample period or by 
the time the team left the Premiership, and the relative cumulative excess points (obtained by 
dividing the excess cumulative points by the number of matches played in the Premiership). 
Table 2 is divided into 4 panels. Within each panel, the teams are ranked by cumulative 
excess performance. Panel A shows the top 9 teams which were present in the Premiership 
throughout the entire sample period6. The table shows some association between the number 
of management changes and team performance. Except for Everton and Liverpool, lower 
frequency of manager changes seems to be compatible with higher average and cumulative 
performance, which provides support for hypothesis 1. Data in panels C and D, which contain 
teams that played less than 300 games in the Premiership, also provide support for hypothesis 
1. For example, Queens Park Rangers has the lowest percentage change and the highest 
cumulative abnormal points. In Panel D, the 3 top teams have only 1 change among them, 
while the bottom 3 teams have 5 changes. However, when examining the teams in Panel B, 
the picture is not so clear. The top 3 performing teams have more relative percentage changes 
than the lower teams. 
The correlation coefficient between percentage manager change and relative 
cumulative performance is -0.38, while the correlation between percentage manager change 
and the mean moving-average is -0.24. These statistics provide evidence of the negative 
association between manager change and overall team performance. In addition, the 
                                                 
6 These are Manchester United, Liverpool, Arsenal, Leeds, Chelsea, Everton, Aston Villa, Tottenham and 
Southampton. Leeds and Southampton are no longer ‘top’ teams due to relegation from the Premier League. 
However, this occurred after the timeframe of this dataset and is immaterial to the data analysis. 
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correlation coefficient between percentage manager change and the standard deviation of 
moving-average performance is 0.10. The analysis suggests that teams with a higher rate of 
manager change tend to be more volatile in terms of performance. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Tenure and Performance 
We run two regressions to investigate the effect of tenure on both average and 
cumulative performance. Because the teams did not play the same number of matches, we use 
a relative measure of manager change, called the change ratio. This represents the number of 
managers a given team changes every 100 matches. We run the following two regressions: 
iii CRAM εαα ++= 10  
iii CRRCUM εαα ++= 10  
where iAM  is the sample-time mean of the 10 match moving average for team i; iCR  is the 
change ratio; iRCUM  is the relative cumulative excess points; and iε  is a disturbance term. 
We run two sets of tests, one including only the top 9 teams and another including all teams. 
The results are summarised in Table 3. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
When analysing the top 9 teams, the results suggest strong negative association 
between performance and manager change. The coefficients are significant (p ≤ 0.01) and the 
R-squares are in excess of 70% for both average and cumulative performance. However, 
estimating the model using the full 28-team sample weakens the results. For both average and 
cumulative performances, the association is weaker and is insignificant for average 
performance but significant at the 5% level for cumulative performance. Moreover, there is a 
possibility that the coefficients are compromised by endogeneity in the regressor (CR) since 
manager change can also depend simultaneously on the team’s performance. Although the 
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assumption that managers’ decisions and actions determine performance is the basis for 
leadership and succession research, we still cannot discount the possibility that the 
performance of staff and so the organisation can be simultaneously influenced by other forces 
independent of the manager (Giambatista et al., 2005). However, given limitations in data 
availability, it is not possible for us to obtain any instrumental variables with which to correct 
the possibility of such bias. Still, we cautiously state that statistically significant evidence 
exists herein of a negative relationship between manager change and both short and long-term 
performance. The results indicate that more frequent manager change is detrimental to 
average and cumulative performance, providing support for hypothesis 1. 
Explaining Cumulative Performance 
The results of the cumulative performance effect are based on data from the top 9 
teams (those present throughout the entire sample period). Ideally, all available teams should 
be included in the analysis, but cumulative estimation results are only comparable if the teams 
played for the same period of time. This analysis will necessarily suffer from survivor bias so 
the results in this instance should be treated with caution. However, we do supplement the 
cumulative performance results with the ‘current’ performance analysis in which we use all 
available teams. Survivor bias is partially mitigated by these additional tests. 
Table 4 presents the cumulative regression results. The parameter 0β  shows how fast 
a team is improving relative to the average benchmark team. As suggested in Table 2, 
Manchester United is far ahead of the rest, followed by Arsenal and Liverpool. The worst 
teams are Southampton and Everton, which experience a downfall relative to the benchmark. 
Tottenham is evolving roughly at the same rate as the benchmark, although the coefficient is 
still positive and significant. The effects of 10 matches before change, 10 short-term matches 
and 30 long-term matches afterwards are captured by 1β , 2β  and 3β . These measure the 
changes from the cumulative trend ( 0β ) that occur during these specific periods. 
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------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Most teams experience a significant fall in performance in the period preceding 
manager change. However, there are three exceptions, namely Aston Villa, Leeds and 
Liverpool. The long-term period is interesting. In most cases 3β  has the same negative sign 
and magnitude as 1β . This is particularly true for Arsenal, Chelsea, Everton, Southampton, 
Tottenham and to some extent Leeds. Thus, hypothesis 3 is rejected as a positive effect was 
expected. However none of the short-term coefficients are significant. But since the periods 
before change and after the short-term timeframe (following change) are negative, significant 
and of the same scale (in the majority of cases), this suggests that during the short-term the 
team’s performance reverts to its overall (outside-event) performance ( 0β ). For example, in 
the case of Arsenal, while its overall performance during normal times is 0.410, it is 0.301 
before the change, goes up to 0.408 during the short term and down again to 0.299 after that. 
Thus, although the coefficient is insignificant, a short-term effect may exist. But in that 
context hypothesis 2 would be rejected as the effect appears moderately positive, not negative 
as predicted. A value of zero for 2β  simply means that the team temporarily goes back to its 
outside-event potential. Although most teams behave in a similar manner, there are two 
exceptions. For Aston Villa the effect is absent, while Liverpool is the only team that 
significantly increases its performance after the short-term period. 
Overall, the average value for the period before change and long-term periods ( 1β  and 
3β ) are -0.027 and -0.026 respectively. The associated t-ratios are 1.99 and 1.87, both 
significant at the 5% level. These effects are significant, negative and of the same magnitude 
and so reject hypothesis 3. In the long-term after change therefore, performance continues to 
be poor. The average value of the short-term coefficient ( 2β ) however is -0.001 with a t-ratio 
of -0.317. This confirms the rejection of hypothesis 2. Performance does not decrease in the 
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short-term after change. The results imply a short-term return to potential performance as the 
deviation from overall long-term performance ( 0β − 2β ) is minor compared to before the 
change ( 1β ) and long-term after change ( 3β ). 
Explaining Current Performance 
We estimate the pooled probit model based on data from 28 teams. 10 teams have less 
than 120 matches in the Premiership and were excluded from the sample. The included teams 
have sample sizes varying from 129 observations to 462 (we lose 10 observations for using 
moving averages). However, the majority of teams played more than 300 matches (Table 2). 
Thus, we have an unbalanced panel with a total of 9193 team-time observations. 
The results for current performance are shown in Table 5. All coefficients are 
significant with the exception of the coefficient of tA . The pre-change, short-term and long-
term effects are captured by tB , tA  and tL  respectively. The short-term coefficient ( tA ) is 
non-significant and has the same interpretation as the one given for the cumulative 
performance analysis above and confirms the rejection of hypothesis 2. The coefficients of tB  
and tL  are negative and significant, which suggest that the probability of good performance 
by a typical team decreases just before the change and in the long-term afterwards. This result 
rejects hypothesis 3. A given team is therefore expected to undergo a significant fall in 
performance before the change, a return to the potential performance during the short term 
and a fall of a smaller magnitude to the one before the change in the long term afterwards. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
To see the effect of manager change on the probability of performance by a given 
team before the change, 10 games after the change, and 30 games afterwards; we calculate the 
marginal effect of the three dummy variables. To do that, we set the other regressors ( 1−tp , 
2−tp , 3−tp , and tMA ) equal to their mean values in equation 5. We then calculate the marginal 
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effect as the probability when the dummy in question equals zero (that is, normal times) 
minus the probability when the dummy in question equals one (that is, during one of the three 
events). The marginal effect on the probability to win, draw and lose is given in Table 6. 
The results in Table 6 suggest that on average, during the 10 matches before the 
change, the probability of losing increases by almost 10% while the probability of winning 
decreases by about the same. In the short term, the marginal effect is small but goes in the 
opposite direction, with about 2% lower probability of loss and approximately 2% higher 
probability of winning. However, these effects are statistically insignificant. The long-term 
effect sees a reversal in performance. The probability of a loss increases by 4.51% compared 
to normal times, while the probability of a win decreases by 4.56%. In all cases, the marginal 
effect on the probability of a draw is relatively small. These results provide further evidence 
to reject hypotheses 2 and 3. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
A more detailed effect is given in Table 7, which shows predicted probabilities for a 
number of circumstances and for various team performances. The first three panels of Table 7 
show the probabilities outside the 50-match event window (normal times). In each of these 
three panels we calculate the probabilities suggested by the estimated model for a team whose 
moving average is 0, 1, 2 and 3. The two extremes are for a team that lost all previous ten 
matches and a team that won all previous ten matches. 
First, small differences exist between the three cases in the first three panels, reflecting 
the domination of the moving average. Probabilities of wins (losses) are higher (lower) when 
a team has three previous consecutive wins, compared with three previous draws and three 
losses, respectively. While these differences are marginal, the difference that one moving-
average point makes is large. A team that moves from 0 to 1 sees its probability of winning 
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increase from 0.114 to 0.278, while the probability of loss decreases by roughly the same 
amount (Panel A). 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
In the last three panels of Table 7 we set 1−tp , 2−tp , and 3−tp  equal to zero to see the 
combined effect of the moving-average performance and the probability of performance 
before, after and long after the manager change. While there is a change in probabilities for 
increasing moving-average performance, the expected change for the three event windows is 
also found. For example, for a team that has recently been doing very well (e.g., MA=2), we 
see that the probability of a loss is 31% in the 10 weeks before the change, goes down to 
20.7% during the 10 weeks after the change, and then goes up again to 26.1% during the 
following 30 weeks. At the same time the probability of a win is 40.9% before, going up to 
53.5% during the short-term period, and then dropping to 46.4%. To check that our results are 
robust to the selection of window size, we repeated the estimation using 10-10-50 (10 
matches pre-change, 10 after change and 50 matches thereafter) and 20-10-50. The results 
were virtually identical. 
In summary, the test results lead us to conclude that hypothesis 1 is accepted such that 
longer manager tenure is positively related to performance. This is further evidenced by 
declining performance as the number of manager changes increases. We reject hypothesis 2 
that in the short-term after change, a decline in performance occurs. Rather, the results across 
our tests imply that short-term performance returns to the long-run potential of the 
organisation, indicating no particular decline or improvement. Lastly, hypothesis 3 is rejected 
as we find evidence that in the long-term after change, organisations continue to suffer from 
poor performance indicating that much longer tenures are needed to improve results. Overall, 
these results suggest that manager change to rapidly improve performance in the short and 
long-term is a flawed strategy. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study sought to understand the short-term and long-term performance effects of 
manager change. We draw several conclusions. First, lower rates of manager change are 
associated with higher average and cumulative performance. This is consistent with our 
expectation, following exceptions in Hambrick & Fukutomi’s (1991) theory, that giving 
managers more time at the helm can benefit organisations when managers are pushed by 
powerful stakeholders to learn and remain vigilant to sustain performance. Sacrificing 
managers may then be a mistake for two reasons: (1) although short-term performance does 
not worsen, it does not greatly improve either; (2) in the long-term after change, performance 
deteriorates again. The efficacy of manager dismissal versus manager persistence is therefore 
questionable. Some deterioration in performance is inevitable over time as human capital 
resources deteriorate and competitors improve but our findings suggest that manager change 
compromises recovery.  
 Second, the expectation that turbulence after manager change would disrupt the 
organisation and further weaken performance did not materialise. However, our results do not 
exonerate proponents of change from arguments of scapegoating. We find that some reprieve 
in performance can occur in the short-term since performance does not decline at the same 
rate prior to dismissal; but no material turnaround occurs either. Since periods of performance 
before and after the short term are negative, significant and mostly of the same magnitude, it 
implies that in the short term, organisations revert to performing in line with their expected 
long-term potential. Some form of ‘shock effect’ appears to influence the short-term 
performance of the organisation (cf. Audas et al., 2002; Bruinshoofd & ter Weel, 2003), yet 
the efficacy of a dismissal strategy for short-term recovery remains poor. 
 Third, the change to negative performance in the long-term period afterwards suggests 
that underlying organisational weaknesses once again take hold and new managers struggle to 
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appreciate the problems afflicting the organisation. Two possibilities account for this. The 
short-term reprieve creates an illusion that fools the manager into believing that organisational 
problems have been addressed and so the manager learns information that has little long-term 
value, thereby necessitating a longer learning curve; or, the learning process must restart again 
as the manager recognises that much greater problems are endemic in the organisation. The 
lack of recovery is consistent with scapegoating and vicious circle theories. 
Implications for Theory 
The findings are indicative of flaws in Gabarro’s (1987) theory of the value of initial 
organisation changes that follow manager change. Not only are short-term changes 
suboptimal, they do not address the real problems of the organisation either. Short-term 
adaptations create disruptions that temporarily suspend performance decline, but this 
suspension creates an illusion that masks greater weaknesses. Performance deteriorates again 
soon afterwards owing to delayed effects from these non-strategic adaptations. Gabarro’s 
(1987) work fails to foresee the negative consequences of short-term experimentation on two 
grounds. First, time allows managers to develop and apply idiosyncratic knowledge but 
change takes away that knowledge7; second, new managers must then learn about the 
organisation to put appropriate long-term solutions in place. By incorporating the illusion of 
short-term recovery, the non-strategic nature of short-term organisational adaptation, and the 
loss of firm-specific knowledge into scapegoating and vicious circle theories, these theories 
can better explain the short-term effects of manager change. 
Similar weaknesses are present in Hambrick & Fukutomi’s (1991) work because they 
assume that new managers have a positive impact immediately when taking post which 
continues until eventual dysfunction. This theory fails to account for the turbulence that 
occurs as new managers learn in a trial and error way of the faults in the organisation 
                                                 
7 Some knowledge is retained in coaching staff but it is not as rich as that of the manager because of his broader 
understanding of players’ contextual and intrinsic talents and team talent (Brady et al., 2008). Also, manager 
change normally leads to change in coaching staff as the new manager brings in his own people. 
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responsible for duress and experiment with changes that imprint their style onto the 
organisation. Our findings suggest that tenure and life-cycle theories need adjustment to 
account for an initial period of turbulence stemming from the disruption new managers cause 
as they make erroneous organisational changes and learn inappropriately. By accounting for 
these effects, tenure and life-cycle theories can then offer a more complete and balanced 
treatment of the process and outcomes of manager change. 
Taken together, our results suggest that disruptive and illusionary effects caused by 
the short-term adaptations of new managers account for contradictions between the positive 
and negative effects of manager change and the perpetual spiral of decline that can then 
emerge. These results embellish vicious circle theory, and require tenure and life-cycle 
theories to reconsider the complexities of change. Exceptions to life-cycle theory exist 
whereby the effect of tenure is not purely concave owing to short-term disruption and long-
term misdiagnosis and mistreatment that are brought about by failings in the new manager’s 
learning. At present, life-cycle theory oversimplifies the case for change. The loss of firm-
specific knowledge also provides alternative explanation for the value of existing managers, 
and offers an alternative interpretation of scapegoating theory in this context. 
Implications for Management 
A feature of the football industry is the constantly declining tenure of managers. Our 
results suggest that this is indicative of vicious circle theory. Sacking the manager precipitates 
further performance problems because the incoming manager does not understand the 
weaknesses of the organisation. Despite the illusion of a short-term recovery, weaknesses 
again take hold and performance deteriorates again. Performance declines not because of the 
disruption itself but because the illusion of reprieve confounds errors made in diagnosing and 
treating organisational weaknesses. The answer to this is giving managers more time because 
we find that in general longer tenures are associated with better average and cumulative 
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performance. At the minimum our findings reveal that managers do matter but to matter 
positively, they need time; far more than current average tenures. Misspecification of the 
performance consequences of manager change can lead to false hopes of a turnaround and 
inappropriate decision-making. If managers are to be replaced, mechanisms are needed to 
retain firm-specific knowledge and new managers must receive ample support to grow into 
their new roles when the brief reprieve diminishes. 
In the short-term, new managers can make rapid changes to playing style (strategy) 
and training schemes to tease out the intrinsic talent of employees. However, such changes 
should not result in overconfidence that organisational problems have been resolved. New 
managers need time to learn of the true faults that created poor performance in the first place, 
but this depends on managers undertaking a thorough process of diagnosis. In time, managers 
should sufficiently train, renew and improve the human capital of the organisation. As Brady 
et al. (2008) show, exceptional performance does not come from acquiring more expensive 
talent but rather from managers’ ability to coax contextual talent from employees. Together 
with our findings, manager change will not rapidly rehabilitate performance thus 
organisational stakeholders must be patient. Prematurely replacing managers will only worsen 
the organisation’s distress as it descends into a cycle of decline. 
Longer incumbent tenures are associated with better average and cumulative 
performance. Thus, managers’ performance should be evaluated in terms of progress on 
diagnosing and treating weaknesses prior to dismissal. Managers should receive sufficient 
time at the helm to demonstrate progress at overcoming the causes of poor performance. Only 
then can the tenure of a manager be accurately judged and a decision made as to whether 
manager change is strategic and in the best interests of the organisation. When organisations 
become gripped by weaknesses, manager change masks these problems, which further 
exacerbates poor performance. The driver of manager change should be managers’ 
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ineffectiveness in tackling organisational weaknesses otherwise change is simply an act of 
scapegoating and could result in a vicious cycle developing. Longer tenures allow managers 
time to develop idiosyncratic knowledge; but change removes that resource and prompts a 
long recovery period as new managers struggle to learn about and adapt to the organisation. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Several limitations affect our work. First, our findings may not readily generalise to 
other industries. Although football organisations are commercial, profit-making entities, they 
are influenced more readily by shareholder, fan and media pressure and face unusual industry 
and organisation-level constrains. Second, we do not distinguish the type of manager change 
by insider versus outsider succession. Insider succession and retirement are rare events in the 
football industry, thus limited data availability precludes such a test. Third, we do not account 
for other possible determinants of performance, such as human capital. The quality of 
coaching staff and the playing staff may affect performance. Still, Brady et al. (2008) found 
that acquiring expensive talent alone does not automatically provide exceptional performance. 
Exceptional performance rather depends on the skill of the manager in unlocking individual 
player and team talents. But a greater wealth of talent might maintain performance during 
acute injury periods for example. 
Fourth, the relationship between tenure and performance may be quadratic. A positive 
relationship between tenure and performance may only be to a point. At a certain level of 
tenure, diminishing returns may set in, but the short tenures of football managers prevent us 
from temporally capturing any downside effects of increased tenure. Fifth, prior expectations 
and alternative performance measures may affect the tenure of a manager. Such variables are 
difficult to model and a lack of data compromises such a test. Similar to prior studies, we 
appropriately assume that the board of football teams want their teams to be as highly-ranked 
as possible, and failure to rank sufficiently highly is the chief reason for manager change 
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(Koning, 2003). But expectations may accelerate or decelerate dismissal therefore our 
inability to model expectations represents a limitation. We advocate further research to 
address these limitations. 
Given the vicious circle that appears from our findings, it is highly unlikely that blame 
for poor performance is fully attributable to managers. New managers inherit organisational 
problems of which they have little knowledge. Time is needed to properly learn and diagnose 
these problems to make appropriate changes. If these managers are routinely replaced each 
time performance declines, then managers alone cannot be blamed for poor performance as 
the decline becomes perpetual. Breaking the cycle requires giving managers time. But at some 
point manager change may be necessary. Change should not result from performance duress 
alone but rather should result from persistent failure to respond to weaknesses underpinning 
performance duress. Further research is needed to resolve the timeframe required for 
managers to make a difference; criteria to establish when managers have failed to understand 
and treat organisational weaknesses; and mechanisms to safeguard firm-specific knowledge 
when manager change takes place. 
Although we find some agreement with Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) that manager 
change can provide new organisational impetus, we also find several differences. Longer 
incumbent tenures appear to render long-term benefits to the organisation more readily than 
change. Exceptions likely depend on competitive, owner and media pressure on football 
managers to remain vigilant, and the presence of firm-specific knowledge. The football 
industry is characterised by short tenures and so we cannot verify this exception by testing for 
a curvilinear effect. On the other hand, exceptions might surface due to person-organisation 
fit8. Fit can exist when the new manager’s prior knowledge is highly suitable to the 
circumstances of the organisation, or the new manager’s leadership style being particularly 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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suitable. Accordingly, research is needed to identify exceptions to Hambrick & Fukutomi’s 
(1991) life-cycle. 
Our primary contribution is the discovery of illusionary effects. Such illusionary 
effects can lead to spirals of decline whereby performance seems to improve, falls again over 
a period of time, which leads to change, and subsequently the restart of this cycle. Far greater 
academic attention must be paid to this concept as it is currently not considered in existing 
theories of manager change. Without question, poor strategic decisions could occur due to 
illusionary effects, such as unnecessary manager change, commitment of significant financial 
resources and increases in debt to fund acquisitions. Future research agendas should prioritise 
these illusionary effects. 
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Table 1: Summary of Manager Change Research in a Sporting Context 
Study Sport Industry Findings Reasons Gap 
Grusky (1963) Major League Baseball Negative relationship between 
change and performance creates a 
vicious circle of continual decline 
(poor performance triggers 
manager change which intensifies 
poor performance). 
Perpetual cycle of decline 
driven by increased 
organisational instability 
brought on by change. 
Implies short-term 
deterioration after manager 
change leading to further 
panic which triggers 
additional change. 
Brown (1982) National Football League Following change, organisational 
effectiveness and performance do 
not increase; change better viewed 
as ritual scapegoating. 
Disruptive effect of 
change offered as 
rationale for this outcome. 
Does not identify whether 
performance would have 
improved over time (after 
disruption settles). 
McTeer, White & 
Persad (1995) 
Major League Baseball, 
National Football 
League, National 
Basketball Association 
and National Hockey 
League 
Performance immediately after a 
manager change increased but in 
the full season after change 
showed no improvement. 
Possible shock effect but 
underlying weaknesses 
seem unrelated to the 
previous manager. 
Long-term effect is 
unknown beyond the next 
season or year. 
Audas et al. (2002) English football 
organisations 
Organisations that change 
managers within the season under-
perform over the following 3 
months. 
Minimum 3 months 
needed to train, renew, 
improve and align human 
capital with the demands 
of the new manager, and 
to adapt the organisation. 
Performance effect if any 
after this 3-month period 
remains unclear. 
Bruinshoofd & ter 
Weel (2003) 
Dutch football Premier 
League 
Change preceded by decline in 
performance but followed by some 
improvement in performance; 
control group shows that when the 
manager would not have been 
changed, performance would have 
improved more rapidly. 
Disruption and loss of 
knowledge may explain 
result; sacking manager a 
costly way of signalling a 
problem with the team; 
manager is a scapegoat. 
Does not distinguish 
between short-term and 
long-term effect. 
Koning (2003) Dutch football Premier Team performance does not Disruption and loss of Does not distinguish 
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League improve when a manager is fired 
and new managers perform worse 
than their fired predecessors in 
several instances. 
knowledge may explain 
result; since results do not 
improve after a change of 
manager, the board of a 
team seems to intervene 
for other reasons (fan and 
media pressure). 
between short-term and 
long-term effect. 
Giambatista (2004) National Basketball 
Association 
Hambrick & Fukutomi (1991) 
learning effects supported for first 
3 years; performance declines 
from 7 years onwards. In-season 
succession disrupted performance; 
between-season succession not 
related to first-year performance. 
Effects stronger for coaches than 
owners.  
Managers need time to 
learn and teach after 
change; increase 
performance but 
eventually experience 
stagnation. 
Implies initial short-term 
disruption followed by 
recovery. Tenure 
unusually long versus 
short average tenure in 
football organisation. 
Rowe et al. (2005) National Hockey League Giving managers more time leads 
to better performance. 
New managers need time 
to lead organisation 
reconstructing, learn the 
right initiative to 
undertake and the right 
ways to implement those 
initiatives. 
Does not preclude 
retaining managers given 
their unique knowledge of 
firm-specific conditions. 
Short term effect unclear. 
Implies long-term return 
from tenure or change. 
Dios Tena & Forrest 
(2007) 
Spanish top-division 
football 
Modest positive differences to 
match results in the short term; but 
effect derived almost entirely from 
improvement at the home stadium. 
No change in away performance 
detected.  
New coach does not bring 
technical solutions to the 
weaknesses of the team. 
Long term performance 
remains unclear. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Team Performance 
 
Matches 
in 
Premier-
ship 
Number  
of  
Manager  
Changes 
Change  
Ratio  
Mean 
MV 
St. Dev. 
MV 
Cum. 
Excess 
Points 
Relative  
Cum. Exc. 
Points 
Panel A. Top Teams 
Manchester United 462 0 0.000 1.916 0.158 345.667 0.748 
Arsenal 462 2 0.433 1.774 0.178 229.667 0.497 
Liverpool 462 5 1.082 1.576 0.069 155.667 0.337 
Leeds United 462 4 0.866 1.563 0.097 94.667 0.205 
Chelsea 462 5 1.082 1.398 0.102 87.667 0.190 
Aston Villa 462 5 1.082 1.447 0.062 43.667 0.095 
Tottenham Hot 462 6 1.299 1.243 0.104 -18.333 -0.040 
Everton 462 4 0.866 1.298 0.106 -38.333 -0.083 
Southampton 462 6 1.299 1.144 0.050 -69.333 -0.150 
Panel B. Teams with more than 300 matches 
Newcastle United 360 4 1.111 1.735 0.126 117.667 0.327 
Blackburn Rovers 330 6 1.818 1.723 0.154 58.667 0.178 
Sheffield Wednesday 310 4 1.290 1.508 0.121 -3.667 -0.012 
Wimbledon 329 3 0.912 1.388 0.116 -20.000 -0.061 
Manchester City 313 4 1.278 1.427 0.157 -26.667 -0.085 
West Ham Unit 382 2 0.524 1.138 0.102 -40.667 -0.107 
Middlesbrough 317 3 0.946 1.164 0.080 -47.000 -0.148 
Coventry City 368 4 1.087 1.167 0.059 -79.000 -0.215 
Panel C. Teams with more than 200 matches 
Queens Park Rangers 215 2 0.930 1.407 0.075 0.000 0.000 
Nottingham Forrest 251 4 1.594 1.368 0.074 -18.000 -0.072 
Sunderland 201 4 1.990 1.176 0.119 -44.333 -0.221 
Leicester City 240 5 2.083 0.999 0.183 -63.333 -0.264 
Derby County 201 3 1.493 0.915 0.245 -66.333 -0.330 
Panel D. Teams with more than 100 matches 
Sheffield United 138 0 0.000 1.406 0.132 -6.333 -0.046 
Crystal Palace 135 1 0.741 1.322 0.100 -15.333 -0.114 
Charlton Athletic 166 0 0.000 1.139 0.089 -16.667 -0.100 
Norwich City 178 2 1.124 1.241 0.101 -17.667 -0.099 
Bolton Wander 129 1 0.775 0.860 0.154 -37.333 -0.289 
Ipswich Town 192 2 1.042 1.174 0.149 -45.333 -0.236 
 
Table 3: Regression Effect of Tenure on Average and Cumulative Performance 
 Coefficient t-stat p-value R-squared Coefficient t-stat p-value R-squared 
 
 
Average performance (Top 9 Teams) Average performance (All Teams) 
Constant 1.950 19.590 0.000  1.465 13.781 0.000  
Change Ratio -0.524 -5.134 0.001 79.02% -0.118 -1.278 0.213 5.91% 
 
 
Cumulative performance (Top 9 Teams) Cumulative performance (All Teams) 
Constant 0.725 5.650 0.001  0.180 1.824 0.080  
Change Ratio -0.590 -4.489 0.003 74.28% -0.178 -2.081 0.047 14.28% 
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Table 4: Regression Results for Cumulative Performance 
  ManU Arsnl Livrp LeedsU Chels Aston Tott Evert Sthp 
α  -22.778* 0.100 -16.570* 1.642* -18.606* -1.601* -11.317* 7.329* -0.751 
0β  0.753* 0.410* 0.338* 0.225* 0.175* 0.131* 0.006* -0.099* -0.167* 
1β   -0.109* -0.002 -0.010 -0.056* 0.005 -0.007* -0.015* -0.020* 
2β   0.002 0.000 0.009 -0.011 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
3β   -0.111* 0.019* -0.021* -0.046* -0.004 -0.005* -0.017* -0.022* 
The teams are, respectively, Manchester United, Arsenal, Liverpool, Leeds United, Chelsea, Aston Villa, 
Tottenham, Everton, and Southampton. (*) Indicates significance at the 5% level or lower. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Probit Estimation Results 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-stat p-value 
Intercept -0.479 0.058 -8.260 0.000 
Threshold ( µ ) 0.728 0.011 66.599 0.000 
tB  -0.263 0.038 -6.967 0.000 
tA  0.056 0.050 1.111 0.266 
tL  -0.122 0.030 -3.991 0.000 
1−tp  0.014 0.009 1.646 0.100 
2−tp  0.014 0.006 2.261 0.024 
3−tp  0.013 0.008 1.624 0.104 
tMA  0.620 0.042 14.820 0.000 
N=9193 
 
 
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects 
 
Prob. 
(Loss) 
Prob. 
(Draw) 
Prob. 
(Win) 
Before 9.99% -0.40% -9.59% 
After Short -1.99% -0.16% 2.15% 
After Long 4.51% 0.05% -4.56% 
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Table 7: Predicted Probabilities 
Before 
  
After  
Short  
After 
Long  
Moving 
Average  
Prob, 
(Loss) 
Prob. 
(Draw) 
Prob. 
(Win) 
Panel A: 3 consecutive losses 
   0 0.684 0.202 0.114 
   1 0.444 0.278 0.278 
   2 0.224 0.264 0.513 
   3 0.084 0.174 0.743 
Panel B: 3 consecutive draws 
   0 0.669 0.209 0.122 
   1 0.428 0.280 0.292 
   2 0.211 0.259 0.529 
   3 0.078 0.167 0.756 
Panel C: 3 consecutive wins 
   0 0.639 0.222 0.139 
   1 0.396 0.283 0.321 
   2 0.188 0.250 0.562 
   3 0.066 0.153 0.781 
Panel D: Probabilities Before Change 
Yes   0 0.771 0.158 0.071 
Yes   1 0.549 0.254 0.197 
Yes   2 0.310 0.282 0.409 
Yes   3 0.132 0.217 0.651 
Panel E: Probabilities After Change (Short Term) 
 Yes  0 0.664 0.211 0.125 
 Yes  1 0.422 0.281 0.297 
 Yes  2 0.207 0.258 0.535 
 Yes  3 0.076 0.164 0.760 
Panel F: Probabilities After Change (Long Term) 
  Yes 0 0.726 0.182 0.092 
  Yes 1 0.492 0.269 0.239 
  Yes 2 0.261 0.274 0.464 
  Yes 3 0.104 0.194 0.702 
 
 
 
 
